This has been a momentous week in global affairs, with the raucous G7 summit, the meeting between the US president and the leader of North Korea, and Washington’s decision to impose up to $50bn in tariffs on China. The impact on Asia will be particularly profound.
The confluence could precipitate a Sputnik-like moment for the continent’s leaders. Many of them may begin to rethink the strategic order in Asia and their own security and economic alignments. They will be asking fundamental questions: is the US still a reliable ally and partner? Do institutions like the G7 matter? Are nuclear weapons and arms races making a comeback? Does liberal trade have a future? Their answers will be driven by at least three factors.
First, US president Donald Trump has moved beyond unpredictable and impulsive behaviour, which many now expect and can live with. He was deliberately provocative and intentionally disruptive of both allies and institutions that have been bedrocks of US strategy. At the G7, which the US historically leads, Mr Trump arrived late and left early, picked a fight with Canada, called for Russia to be readmitted and refused to sign the final communique.
At the Singapore summit with North Korea, Mr Trump unilaterally cancelled the US’s annual South Korea military drills without consulting either Seoul or Tokyo (and perhaps the Pentagon too). He then declared North Korea was “no longer a nuclear threat” and repeated an earlier wish to save money by withdrawing US forces from South Korea.
US and China inch closer to a trade war
For many Asian policymakers, Mr Trump’s behaviour is a flashing red light. They play the long game, value clear communication and want a strong American presence in the region. Given Mr Trump’s apparent lack of interest in the long term, Asian leaders may start reducing their exposure to Washington’s disruptive acts. Of course, there won’t be overnight shifts and most leaders will probably hold off on big changes until the next US presidential election in 2020. But, some countries could start to limit their vulnerability to US trade actions and hedge their reliance on US security commitments.
Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who actively courted Mr Trump, would have to respond if the US targeted imposed tariffs on automobiles and auto parts. Allies have their limits.
For many in Asia, this situation coincides with a dangerous time: China is increasingly using coercive means to advance interests ranging from market access to maritime issues. Normally, Asian countries opt for close relations with the US to offset Chinese pressure, but that approach is now costly.
Second, the Singapore summit substantially increases the chances of North Korea becoming the next de facto nuclear weapon state — the Pakistan of east Asia. The US elicited no new commitments from Kim Jong Un; if anything the US moved towards Pyongyang’s formulation for denuclearisation. Yet North Korea received the validation it has been seeking for decades.
At best, both sides agreed to establish a process to negotiate denuclearisation, but the last 30 years are littered with examples of North Korea recycling the same commitments and using time to its advantage. Mr Trump’s miscalculation is to assume he retains leverage over North Korea through sanctions. Though UN sectoral sanctions remain in place, the Chinese government and private firms have restarted commercial activities that give Mr Kim time and space. Others in Asia will follow.
A nuclear North Korea will reorder security affairs across Asia. New nuclear powers will not pop up overnight, but militarised security competition may become the new normal. That matters for a region which accounts for almost 60 per cent of global growth and 40 per cent of global output. There will also be demands for greater US security presence. Meeting them would antagonise China. But without a larger US commitment, some Asian countries may opt for unilateral military build ups or alignment with China.
Third, this week’s events redound to China’s strategic benefit, as President Xi Jinping promotes a more statist view of overseas investment, a more coercive approach to diplomacy and an ideological slant to its role in the region. The G7 drama made a remarkable contrast to the comity of this week’s annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation held in Qingdao, China. While SCO members do not remotely compare in economic heft to the G7, Mr Xi used the event to once again articulate his economic vision, which puts China at the centre of setting global rules and standards for technology and commerce.
In Asia, national security is fundamentally about economic strength. Greater dependence on China — real or perceived — could alter diplomatic alignments when the US looks unreliable, distracted, and even provocative. As challenging as dealing with China may be for many Asian countries, Mr Trump’s confrontational strategies are making that alternative look attractive. Beijing may be betting on it.
Source : https://www.ft.com/content/62ca945e-7076-11e8-8863-a9bb262c5f53
