India’s defence of its decision to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance relies more on political argument than on a convincing interpretation of international law. In defending New Delhi’s position, India’s Ambassador to the United States, Vinay Mohan Kwatra, places responsibility for the treaty’s present crisis on Pakistan. Yet the central legal question remains: can one party to a binding international agreement simply declare it suspended because political relations have deteriorated?Download Interactive Maps
The IWT is not a political arrangement that can be switched on and off according to circumstances. Article XII(4) provides that the treaty remains in force until it is terminated through a duly ratified agreement between the two governments. It contains no provision granting either side an unlimited unilateral power to place it in “abeyance.” Changing the terminology cannot create a legal authority that the treaty itself does not provide.
The IWT is not a political arrangement that can be switched on and off according to circumstances.
India’s terrorism-related argument does not resolve this difficulty. New Delhi has connected its decision to the Pahalgam attack and alleged Pakistani responsibility. But allegations, however serious, cannot automatically become established facts under international law. Pakistan has repeatedly condemned terrorism and has itself suffered enormous human and economic losses from terrorist violence. The appropriate response to such allegations is a credible and impartial investigation, not the conversion of unproven claims into automatic grounds for abandoning treaty obligations.
If India possesses conclusive evidence of Pakistani involvement, it should place that evidence before an impartial investigative or judicial mechanism. The same principle applies to competing allegations about the circumstances of an attack. International law cannot be replaced by political narratives simply because relations between two countries are hostile.
The argument that India controls roughly 80 per cent of the waters while Pakistan receives around 20 per cent is also an incomplete way of presenting the IWT. The treaty is not merely an annual calculation of water volume. Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus system concerns the timing, regularity, continuity and predictability of flows. A disruption at a critical agricultural period can produce consequences that an annual percentage cannot reveal.
For Pakistan, therefore, water security extends directly into food production, agriculture, livelihoods, hydropower and economic stability. The practical significance of a river cannot be measured only by how much water reaches a country over an entire year. When water arrives can be just as important as how much arrives. Any attempt to manipulate continuity or timing could create serious downstream economic and humanitarian consequences.
India’s refusal to engage with established dispute-resolution mechanisms creates another serious problem. The IWT contains procedures specifically designed to manage differences and disputes. Yet India has refused to participate in the Hague-based Court of Arbitration proceedings and has rejected the treaty’s established legal framework. Such non-participation does not automatically erase an international proceeding or invalidate the legal process.
The broader principle is important. A state cannot reasonably argue that an international mechanism has no relevance simply because it chooses not to appear before it. If participation were optional whenever a government disliked the direction of a case, treaty-based dispute settlement would lose much of its purpose.
India’s approach also risks establishing a troubling precedent. If states could disregard treaty commitments, withdraw from agreed adjudicatory mechanisms, and then use unilateral political declarations to redefine their legal obligations, international agreements would become conditional instruments of convenience. That would weaken not only the IWT but confidence in treaty law more broadly.
Pakistan, of course, must respond to allegations through evidence, diplomacy and lawful procedures. But bilateral hostility does not turn a binding treaty into an optional document. Nor can accusations without established responsibility and a legally sustainable basis automatically justify unilateral suspension.Download Interactive Maps
The wiser course is to return to the treaty’s mechanisms, pursue impartial investigation of terrorism allegations and use negotiation if amendments are genuinely required. The IWT has survived wars, crises and decades of political hostility because it provides rules where politics often fails.
The treaty was not created to disappear whenever relations become difficult. Water is a shared and essential resource, not a convenient instrument of political pressure. India’s case would be stronger if it addressed the treaty’s legal requirements directly instead of relying on political rhetoric. Ultimately, the issue is not who presents the more compelling narrative; it is whether binding international commitments remain binding when circumstances become inconvenient.
SOURCE:https://dailytimes.com.pk/1544423/politics-cannot-override-law/
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