The End of New START: Why the U.S. Must Rethink Nuclear Strategy
New START Is Obsolete: U.S. Nuclear Strategy in a New Global Order. As the expiration date of the New START Treaty approaches in early 2026, national security analysts are increasingly focused on the future of nuclear arms control. New START, the last remaining bilateral nuclear pact between the U.S. and Russia, has long played a central role in strategic stability. Some experts advocate extending its principles by continuing to observe its limits even after it lapses. While opening new negotiations with Moscow has merit, clinging to outdated restrictions does not. It’s time for the United States to move beyond New START and reimagine its nuclear posture.
When signed in 2010, New START offered several advantages, capping each country’s deployed strategic nuclear warheads at 1,550 and securing bipartisan support through a compromise: Democrats backed nuclear modernization in exchange for Republican approval of the treaty. Yet the global power dynamics that shaped New START have fundamentally changed. At the time, Russia’s nuclear arsenal was aging, and China appeared content with minimal deterrence. Today, both nations have aggressively modernized their capabilities and are collaborating in ways that threaten U.S. interests. New START Is Obsolete: U.S. Nuclear Strategy in a New Global Order
A Shifted Landscape
In the 15 years since the treaty’s inception, Russia and China have undergone dramatic military transformations. Russian President Vladimir Putin claims to have modernized 95% of his country’s strategic forces, including the development of new intercontinental weapons meant to bypass New START limitations. More concerning is Russia’s regional nuclear arsenal—about 2,000 lower-yield weapons with shorter ranges—violating prior Presidential Nuclear Initiatives from the early 1990s that aimed to reduce such stockpiles.
China, under Xi Jinping, is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces, aiming to become a full strategic rival to the U.S. According to Admiral Charles Richard, former head of U.S. Strategic Command, China’s nuclear growth is “breathtaking.” The country is not only building advanced regional capabilities but also forging closer ties with Russia, creating new risks of coordinated conflict across multiple theaters. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission has warned of potential dual-front aggression from this growing partnership.
The Limits of New START
Given this new reality, New START fails to protect U.S. national security. It restricts the U.S. more than its adversaries and does not address regional nuclear threats—those most likely to be used in future conflicts. Maintaining such an agreement while ignoring these evolving challenges would be counterproductive. Instead, the U.S. should prepare to enhance its capabilities once the treaty expires.
Why Arms Control Falls Short
Historically, arms control only works when all parties act in good faith. When nations harbor aggressive ambitions, treaties are often ignored or manipulated. The naval agreements of the 20th century and the Soviet Union’s violations of multiple treaties—including the Biological Weapons Convention and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—offer sobering examples. Putin has already disregarded numerous arms control commitments and is suspected of developing space-based nuclear capabilities, undercutting the Outer Space Treaty. New START Is Obsolete: U.S. Nuclear Strategy in a New Global Order
China, too, resists arms control discussions, viewing them as signs of weakness. The country has dismissed past U.S. overtures and likely won’t consider serious negotiations until it matches U.S. and Russian nuclear capabilities—possibly a decade away. u.s. nuclear strategy
Strategic Adjustments
To address this emerging two-peer nuclear landscape, the U.S. must adjust its force posture. A good starting point is reversing previous reductions made under New START, such as reactivating decommissioned Trident II missile tubes and restoring nuclear capability to de-armed B-52 bombers. Increasing warhead deployment on Trident II and Minuteman III missiles could also strengthen deterrence.
Midterm strategies should include expanding the Strategic Modernization Program, initiated under the Obama administration. This means increasing the number of Columbia-class submarines from 12 to at least 15 and boosting the B-21 bomber fleet from 100 to 150. The U.S. doesn’t need to match Russia or China weapon-for-weapon but must retain enough flexibility to deter both adversaries, even in a worst-case scenario.
Rethinking Treaty Assumptions
Future nuclear agreements must move beyond Cold War logic. Unlike past treaties that focused solely on intercontinental weapons, any new pact must also cover regional nuclear forces—the kind most likely to be used in escalating conflicts. With around 2,000 such weapons, Russia’s regional arsenal is a glaring omission from New START. Ignoring these threats no longer makes strategic sense. u.s. nuclear strategy
Toward a Realistic Treaty Model
A future treaty should cap the total number of deployed nuclear weapons—both regional and strategic—while allowing each side flexibility in its force composition. Though this may lead to a higher ceiling than New START’s 1,550 warhead limit, it would reflect today’s actual military balance. Critics may argue this appears regressive, but it’s more honest and strategically sound than pretending certain weapons don’t exist.
Admittedly, verifying regional nuclear deployments presents challenges due to their small size and dual-use delivery systems. But verification becomes feasible if both sides acknowledge mutual benefit in arms limitations. Without that trust, no treaty will be effective.
The Path Forward
Until serious arms control becomes possible, the U.S. must maximize its deterrent potential and resist the temptation to cling to outdated agreements. Persisting with New START in hopes of coaxing Russia or China to the table reflects a bygone era of bipolar nuclear stability. Facing two coordinated nuclear adversaries, America needs a robust, forward-looking strategy—not nostalgia for the past. New START Is Obsolete: U.S. Nuclear Strategy in a New Global Order