Primarily, strategic analysts, including those of Indian security leadership, presume that India practises three essential pillars when it comes to its nuclear doctrine and force posturing: Credible Minimum Deterrence, No First Use, and Massive Retaliation. We closely read, understand, conceptualise, and critically analyse strategic ambiguities and lacunas that exist in all essential pillars of India’s nuclear strategy. Interestingly, both in practice and theory, all pillars do not remain consistent with what the Indian security leadership earlier conceptualised, and more broadly they do not remain consistent with the so-called minimum deterrence India earlier conceived. For example, it is often analysed that what is ‘credible’ against China cannot be ‘minimum’ against Pakistan when it comes to India’s deterrent force posturing. Also, the strategy of massive retaliation did not make logical sense during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US. It remains equally senseless in the South Asian strategic context. Therefore, the strategy of massive retaliation becomes war-prone and offensive, risking military conflicts.
The question is: where is India heading towards and why and how important is that for Pakistan to reassess such strategic imperatives when it comes to nuclear doctrinal posturing?
First, we need to understand that India’s nuclear doctrinal posture remains a “draft” that India can modify accordingly whenever it decides to do so. Ambiguity lingers on, lacunas persist, and complexity and confusion in India’s nuclear doctrinal posture become the order of the day. Arguably, this becomes problematic. For example, since the 1999 and 2003 draft nuclear doctrines, India continues to shift away from the earlier draft doctrines despite officially claiming that it follows credible minimum deterrence and no first use policy.
The two drafts do not remain consistent with each other. They leave many questions unanswered. The 2003 draft doctrine remains more offensive when India persists to add certain modifiers — that is credible with minimum deterrence, massive with retaliation, which becomes ‘massive retaliation’ in the event of attacks on India, and the urgency to use nuclear weapons if and when Indian forces are attacked anywhere, thus undermining the doctrinal pillar of no first use. Tellingly, India aspires to use its nuclear forces first.
Second, since Pakistan faces an acute security threat from India and since both India and Pakistan continue to have an acute state rivalry, Pakistan needs to reassess India’s evolving doctrinal force posturing, particularly when India is increasing and modernising its conventional and nuclear forces. Many of them are targeting Pakistan. The two rivals have already fought several wars and continue to confront several unresolved crises including the core issue of Kashmir.
India aspires to acquire emerging technologies to further strengthen its deterrent force capabilities. From supersonic, India has recently developed and tested a hypersonic missile. India has acquired the S-400 sophisticated missile defence system. It has been working on its ballistic missile defence system. India has developed an assured second-strike capability in the form of nuclear-powered submarines with increasing ranges of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The construction of more nuclear-powered submarines is in the pipeline. It has considerably increased its nuclear warheads and certainly the delivery systems these increased warheads may require. It has a huge stockpile of fissile materials. Therefore, it is unwilling to become part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). It has developed tactical nuclear weapons and plans to develop a modernised aircraft carrier. India has developed Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and acquired Multiple-Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).
Third, the fast-changing strategic environment, the growing US-India, Russia-India, India-Israel and India-France strategic partnership on several serious strategic projects create a security dilemma in South Asia while enhancing the power potentials of India. In addition, the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — involving the leading states (the US, India, Japan, and Australia) famously known as the QUAD — makes India one of the essential pillars of the US grand strategy for offshore balancing while emphasising the Indo-Pacific region. India as part of the Indo-Pacific strategy is strategically assisted by these countries to contain the spread of China because India and China also have an acute security rivalry. In 1962, India and China fought a war with the latter emerging victorious. More recently they had a severe border standoff at Doklam.
All such ambitious projects provide an incentive to India to wage the so-called limited war against Pakistan. The forward-deployed forces as a broader part of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) are one of such indicators to this ambition. Mistakenly, India recently aspired to wage an unsuccessful surgical strike against Pakistan but soon realised that it could escalate and spiral out of control. Pakistan deterred India from further escalating the crisis. Perhaps, the existence and the value of nuclear deterrence speak louder than words.
Finally, it becomes significant for Pakistan to keep reassessing India’s evolving doctrinal posturing to produce effective countermeasures, retain balance rather than parity, keep deterring the adversary within the ambit of credible minimum deterrence, promote strategic stability, prevent the risk of a major arms race, and work for establishing a much-needed arms control regime in South Asia.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2022.