Why Europe Isn’t Ready for NATO 3.0 By Peter Doran
Why Europe Isn’t Ready for NATO 3.0 By Peter Doran US retrenchment from Europe, even if premised on European burden-sharing, will expose the continent to Russian aggression.
The Trump administration’s anticipated reduction of US forces from Europe hit a reality check last week. Two overlapping missions, one by CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow and one by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to Stuttgart and Brussels, inadvertently exposed potential flaws in the Pentagon’s ongoing retrenchment strategy. While Ratcliffe was in Moscow reportedly to dissuade an expected Russian attack on NATO, Colby was preparing allies for their new role: assuming primary responsibility for deterring the Kremlin with conventional combat power. The timing and purpose of both missions highlight major questions that the transition to “NATO 3.0” has not yet answered.
On paper, NATO 3.0 is meant to strengthen Europe’s armed forces after decades of neglect. Announced in February 2026, it closely follows the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy (NDS). Under this plan, the United States will transfer primary responsibility for conventional deterrence to European allies. After shifting away from Europe, Washington will retain its traditional role as the backbone of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.
It is a classic retrenchment strategy. This requires regional allies to replace American armored brigade combat teams, logistical enablers, deep-strike capabilities, and supporting infrastructure hubs in Germany and Italy, and all before the Kremlin’s reconstituted forces could exploit any gaps. The catch: Europe may need a generation before it is ready to take the helm, while Russia already benefits from hard-earned lessons in Ukraine and a mobilized defense-industrial base.
Inside the Department of Defense, money is the main driver. The NDS anticipates that America’s debt burden will make future defense cuts inevitable; therefore, retrenchment today will keep America solvent tomorrow. One question that the official strategy has not answered, however: under what conditions does this withdrawal from Europe generate vulnerabilities that undermine its intended gains? Ratcliffe’s unannounced trip to Moscow suggests Russia is already preparing to probe the alliance before retrenchment is complete.
In Washington, President Donald Trump dismissed Ratcliffe’s intervention in Moscow as “sort of semi-routine,” downplaying its significance. The record suggests otherwise. William Burns was the last CIA director to visit Moscow; in 2021, he tried and failed to prevent the Kremlin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. Before that, John Brennan traveled to Russia in March 2016 to settle US-Russian activities in Syria. Ratcliffe’s 2026 trip fits the same, high-
According to published reports, his visit was “primarily to warn Russia against any escalatory action against the Baltic States.” This raises another question: If allies replace the United States as the primary conventional deterrent to Russian aggression, as the Pentagon intends, will they also replace the high-stakes diplomatic and intelligence missions that previously fell to the CIA director; and if so, who?
Instead of engaging an aggressive adversary, Colby’s simultaneous mission was to offer a “consultative” olive branch to allies. He also intended to sort out many of the technical and timing questions that the Pentagon’s retrenchment strategy will likely raise. “We want to be able to talk through the pros and cons of a variety of different force levels or dispositions,” a Pentagon official said to Reuters.
The United States has circulated a “Terms of Reference,” which reportedly lays out how Washington will evaluate whether allies can meet their defense spending commitments, as well as their willingness to provide “access, basing, and overflight” (ABO) rights to the United States in a post-retrenchment environment. Highlighting this as a priority, Colby stressed the ABO issue during his public comments with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.
The Trump administration is clearly sensitive to ABO vulnerabilities in a post-retrenchment Europe. During Operation Epic Fury, Spain, France, Italy, and initially the United Kingdom denied the United States airspace and basing access for operations against Iran. That episode prompted Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a longtime Atlanticist, to publicly question the logic of the alliance: “Why are we in NATO? Why do we send trillions of dollars… if in our time of need, we won’t be allowed to use those [European] bases?”
The administration’s retrenchment strategy rests on a significant expectation. While Colby wants to shift “irreversibly” toward a primarily European defense, he simultaneously expects negative allied responses to be reversible on demand from Washington. When the United States requires assistance or access for out-of-area operations, for example, the current strategy assumes that the old, predictable infrastructure of the alliance will simply “snap back” into place. On command, airspace and basing access would be granted as though nothing had changed. This assumption introduces yet another question: What happens when allies don’t “snap back” and America’s ABO options shrink across Europe?
For now, these and other questions remain unanswered. Colby is expected to provide Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with four options for reordering America’s force posture in Europe by November 6. In the meantime, he is threading a needle with allies. “The United States is not leaving the continent. It’s not leaving NATO,” he stressed on his final day in Europe. That much is encouraging. How much or how little will remain could determine the future of Europe’s security architecture, and Trump will have the last word.
About the Author: Peter Doran
Peter Doran is an adjunct senior fellow focused on Russia, Ukraine, and transatlantic relations at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. A recognized expert on Russia, Ukraine, and transatlantic relations, Doran has testified before Congress on topics covering geopolitics, energy security, and state-sponsored disinformation. His work has appeared in Time, Foreign Policy, Defense News, National Review, and The Hill. He is also the author of Breaking Rockefeller (Penguin, 2017). Why Europe Isn’t Ready for NATO 3.0 By Peter Doran
SOURCE:https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-europe-isnt-ready-for-nato-3-0
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