Nuclear crisis management folk may ponder the advice given by66th former United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, to India and Pakistan when trying to avert a nuclear crisis during the 2001-2002 Kargil crisis, “acknowledge the right of others to do what we had done in responding to the attacks on the twin towers (using military force) but also to convince them not to actually do it.” It is a good line with a touch of gravitas — and when confronting the escalating nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan — it excuses the US for wading into Afghanistan after 9/11; forgives deadline-induced diplomatic talks, perspective and a balance of military powers required to prevent nuclear rivals going to war.
The line, used in Mooed Yusuf’s new book, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments, an original historical account of the diplomatic dialogue used by the US, with Pakistan and Indian to avert a nuclear crisis. It is a complicated tale of counter-insurgency, high politics, military standoffs, and duplicity. Played out between the regional rivals India and Pakistan.
Yusuf, an expert on US policy towards South Asia, is a deft guide through a maze and carefully structured account of a modern-day “Great Game” played out since the nascent powers first tested their nuclear weapons in 1988. A year after which, bickering between them over disputed territory in Kashmir sent a shock wave through the Western world still convalescing from the cold war.
His range of sources is stunning. Footnotes reference interviews with US, Pakistan, and Indian officials, as well as documents. Extremely sensitive conversations are reported to add a rich context to the 300-page account.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are perilous as Pyongyang and Tehran’s. Although Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal proceeded Iran and North Korea. It’s nuclear chief scientist AQ Khan reportedly provided invaluable assistance to galvanize both Tehran and Pyongyang‘s nuclear programme — and there were some suspicions Pakistani scientists assisted the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
Yusuf reflects on India and Pakistan’ complex military operations, political stance and the Kashmir conflict. From the Kargil crisis, to the 2001- 2002 Military standoff and the Mumbai crisis, he details the crucial role taken by the US as third-party negotiators to step in, lead and “crisis -manage the situation.”
It is riveting to read a book by a writer that includes all the masterful trickery that encompass the rules of diplomacy. Providing a detailed account of how the US, averted a nuclear crisis between Pakistan and India; detailing their clever diplomacy, manipulation and strategy adopted to contain tensions from both countries during their conflicts. The US commitment to resolving the three crises, included abandoning their own Foreign Policy objectives post 9/11 in Afghanistan; thus, acting as an imperative conduit, that without its intervention would have seen the crisis deteriorate and an alternative history written.
Yusuf encourages a new era of Pakistani and Indian critical thinking, urging young scholars to devise new research strategies and models leading to alternative ways of thinking about regional conflicts
Heading international efforts to manage the 2001 — 2002 Military standoff, quoting the 65th United States Secretary of State, Colin Powel, to provide a glimpse of the mood of the international community when managing the crisis — describing a duty roster “for who is going tomorrow to keep these clowns from killing each other.” How the US and the U.K had devised the roster as part of a strategy, that in the event of crisis escalation, a high-ranking US, or British official could be deployed to the region at short notice.
“Despite the mischief perceived by each side behind their mutual woes,” both countries continued to respond to the messaging delivered by the US — describing an unhealthy dependency on the US to manage the regional crisis. “India knew it had shifted the onus on extracting tangible results from Pakistan to Washington.”
This “shift” to the US, Yusuf asserts, has stymied “dispute resolution” between India and Pakistan who remain uncommitted to resolve the two major issues of contention — terrorism and Kashmir — both conflicts he predicts will eventually escalate into another nuclear crisis — “with every future conflict threatening a more complicated crisis to manage.”
“Pakistan has fared badly when you reflect on history,” looking back at the decades-old conflicts — unlike “India that has gained international support and sympathy.” Yusuf argues there is little incentive now for India to dedicate themselves to conflict resolution, “we are more likely to see a more aggressive military strategy.” He argues.
Although, the book asserts the Western assessment of a nuclear crisis: as an exaggerated threat, emanating from baggage carried by the cold war. It failed to recognise the genuine fear carried by Western powers; that the region remained a crisis away from blundering into an accidental war that could escalate into an international nuclear crisis. Richard Armitage is quoted as saying during the 2001-2002 standoff, “the international community was frightened to death that we were on the verge of nuclear war.”
Yusuf encourages, a new era of Pakistani and Indian critical thinking, urging young scholars to devise new research strategies and models leading to alternative ways of thinking about the regional conflicts.
If Pakistan wants to evolve from its history, it must take responsibility for its role in the past, not blame others — but seek solutions to its conflicts that will aid its progression to a credible regional power. The book is essential reading for young Pakistani scholars who want to shape the future international narrative on Pakistan and alter the course of their country.
The book transcends the bickering and recriminations of the South Asia regional rivals, to give a refreshing strategic approach to conflict resolution. This is an absolute must-read for all policy makers managing crisis and hoping to make a mark on nuclear deterrence strategies.
Published in Daily Times, August 8th 2018.
Source: https://dailytimes.com.pk/279819/indo-paks-nuclear-perils/
