New units By Umair Javed
New units by Umair Javed. The debate on new provinces rests on two different levels. The first is the broader technocratic concern with decentralisation and its hypothetical impact on social welfare and economic growth outcomes. The second is the political economy of constitutional and administrative reform in divided polities. Both aspects are important, and it is revealing which one is highlighted by whom and at what point.
Let’s start with the first one. Recent research presents a nuanced, but positive-leaning relationship between decentralisation reforms and human development/welfare outcomes. In an influential 2016 review article, Channa and Faguet found that decentralisation of health and education spending tends to improve sectoral outcomes, though quality of evidence varies considerably across different cases. Miranda-Lescano et al. (2023) found that decentralising subnational government spending (especially health) positively affects HDI across 57 countries (2000-18). They argue further that such welfare/HDI effects have been understudied relative to growth and governance.
The key here is the type of decentralisation that takes place. Reviews of the fiscal decentralisation literature (such as Canare 2021) suggest that revenue decentralisation and fiscal independence, ie, local governments’ ability to raise their own revenue rather than depend on central transfers, are most consistently associated with better development outcomes, while expenditure decentralisation shows no clear pattern.
On a cautionary note, there is some evidence to suggest that in weakly governed contexts, usually characterised by low levels of bureaucratic efficiency and transparency, the proliferation of administrative units may also hamper developmental processes, including those associated with economic growth.
The discourse in Pakistan needs to take cognisance of what it hopes to primarily achieve through decentralisation.
Overall, the picture that emerges is that the right type of decentralisation varies by country, though once in place, it can lead to important gains in development. For a context like Pakistan, the right type of decentralisation would necessarily include not just administrative devolution, but also fiscal devolution. Local governments at whatever tier they work should have the ability to raise revenue and control expenditure, including expenditure on human resources (ie, bureaucrats and other public sector workers).
The discourse in Pakistan, regulated as it is from the top down, has fluctuated between reworking provincial boundaries or elevating divisions as ‘administrative units’ with expanded control over various governance aspects. What it is unable to do in clear terms is establish the clear case behind why devolution is needed at this stage.
If the primary impetus is to improve social welfare/human development outcomes (ie, outcomes in health and school education), then we may have to come up with a distinct form of devolution. If the impetus is to enable more productive use of capital and labour (ie, catalyse economic growth and transformation), the system that comes out might end up looking a lot different.
For more effective human development, Evans and Heller (2015) make an important argument that states require a greater degree of embeddedness with disadvantaged groups in order to deliver the type of welfare gains needed by them. In other words, this means a form of decentralisation that is accountable and participatory at the local level, and one that can avoid the pitfall of local elite capture by propertied groups or by unaccountable bureaucrats.
Alternatively, for catalysing economic outcomes, East Asia’s experience suggests that close ties between state and capital, along with high levels of bureaucratic efficiency and autonomy, are necessary to deliver higher rates of growth. China’s decentralisation in the contemporary era, for example, is not necessarily built for the expansion of human capabilities, but rather for guiding local capital, and thus it takes a very different form altogether.
The discourse in Pakistan (that pitches technocratic reform) needs to take cognisance of what it hopes to primarily achieve through decentralisation. The form of decentralisation and the requisite level that it would have to be aimed at would then flow from this first clarity.
In the present, it appears the urge for new provinces or even elevating divisions to some as yet unspecified form of administrative unit is driven by political exigency rather than a purpose-led attempt to reform governance. New units By Umair Javed
This brings us to the second level of the issue, which is the political economy of reform. The opposition to new provinces or related administrative rejigging rests on both identity-based and political grounds. Sindhi nationalists speak about the dilution of Sindhi identity and the denial of resources if Karachi is separated. PTI leaders talk about the questionable mandate of the government to undertake a step of this nature. New units By Umair Javed
Both of these are not some exceptional or unique forms of opposition. Ethnolinguistic nationalism is an oppositional force in this country as it is in many others. While I personally don’t see how the creation of new administrative units (without any demographic change) can dilute a linguistic identity, it remains a popular position in Sindh and one that has to be reckoned with through politics.
The PTI’s response also appears quite decisive in this instance. Change that is introduced under questionable conditions, and with limited legitimacy to back it, is precarious and transient. This is exactly what has plagued previous attempts at devolution or admin reconfiguration, including the 2001 local government ordinance. Ultimately, popular opposition to the manner of implementation makes a worthwhile idea seem worthless as well.
The reversal of local governments happened because while they were popular with citizens and local political workers, it was very easy to paint them as the illegitimate engineering attempts of a dictator. Under this reasoning, provincial political elites were able to cement their own type of governing arrangement and recreate centralised rule in the provinces. New units By Umair Javed
A similar risk is posed if large-scale administrative change is pushed both without purpose-led clarity and in the face of popular opposition. Fiscally empowered local governments under the provinces, with reasonable judicial or even constitutional protections, might be the most appropriate concession at this stage. And one that may prove to be more sustainable even after the incumbent regime exits.
The writer teaches politics and sociology at LUMS.
SOURCE:https://www.dawn.com/news/2026327/new-units
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